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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Maintaining cash is closely associated with firms’ 
normal transaction and business operations, and if 
the level of cash holdings is too low, it would affect 
the long-term solvency of companies. A far serious 
problem is that these corporate resources may be 
occupied and used by managers and large 
shareholders for personal benefits at the expense of 
the wealth of firm and the rights of minority 
shareholders may be expropriated. In this study, we 
attempt to explore how managerial ownership and 
other corporate governance characteristics affect the 
level of corporate cash holdings in China.  
The earlier work of Keynes (1936) explains 
three motives of cash holdings, which are the 
transaction motive, the precautionary motive and 
the speculative motive. Researchers apply many 
financial theories to explain corporate cash holdings 
levels, contributing to the emergence of the trade-off 
theory, the financial hierarchy theory and the free 
cash flow theory. The basic idea of the trade-off 
theory is the presence of optimal level of cash 
holdings. This optimal level could be achieved if the 
marginal benefits of cash holdings exceed the 
marginal costs of cash holdings (Myers, 1977; Opler 
et al., 1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). The financial 
hierarchy theory, which is also called the pecking 
order theory, assumes that there is no optimal level 
of cash holdings. This theory presents a hierarchy of 
different sources of financing (Myers & Majluf, 
1984). Regarding corporate cash holdings, it is 
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served as a buffer between retained earnings and 
investment needs (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). The free 
cash flow theory suggests that managers have a 
tendency to hold large cash reserves for their own 
discretionary powers (Jensen, 1986). In fact, there is 
no single theory that could offer better explanation 
the level of corporate cash holdings. 
Several empirical studies have examined the 
factors that affect corporate cash holdings. Majority 
of the existing work is largely carried in the context 
of USA (Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar & 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007; D’Mello et al., 2008; Harford et 
al., 2008; Bates et al., 2009; Duchin, 2010; Kim et al., 
2011). Some of the literature in this area has 
examined this issue in cross-country and 
comparative perspectives. For example, Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) examine a sample of EMU countries, 
whilst Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) investigate 
large industrial companies in Germany, USA and 
Japan. Moreover, Guney et al. (2007) examine the 
cash holding activities in a number of developed 
nations including France, Japan, UK, the USA and 
Germany. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) use a sample of 
UK firms to examine the factors affecting corporate 
cash holding in the UK. Overall, it is worth noting 
that most of the studies put the focus on the cash 
holdings levels in the developed countries. While the 
developed countries generally own favourable 
market environment and mature capital markets, the 
unique economic problems are presented in the 
developing and emerging economies. Thus, the 
research findings on developed countries may not be 
generalized to a wider world. As the largest 
developing country in the world, Chinese context 
offers an interesting opportunity to explore the role 
of corporate governance, and ownership structure in 
explaining corporate cash holdings. Particularly, in 
the recent years, Chinese corporate cash holding 
levels has mounted to an abnormal level. Thus, 
through using the sample period from 2012 to 2016, 
we provide recent empirical insights about the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings in the 
Chinese context.  
Regarding the purpose of this paper, we aim to 
investigate which factors have a significant impact 
on the corporate cash holdings levels in the context 
of Chinese listed firms, during the reporting period 
of 2012 and 2016. We further explore how firm-
specific factors may affect the cash holdings levels 
in Chinese listed companies.  
The major contribution of this paper is that it 
provides fresh empirical insights to the ambiguous 
predictions based on different theories, and to 
further explore the inconclusive results reported in 
the existing studies. Our findings show that the high 
level of cash holdings is related to firms having a 
low level of leverage, high variability in cash flows, 
low bank debts, more investment opportunities, 
higher dividend payouts, low non-cash liquid assets, 
and low level of managerial ownership. 
The outline of the remaining paper consists of 
four sections. Section 2 provides a critique of 
existing literature, section 3 described the research 
methodology of the paper, and subsequently, section 
4 discusses the results, and, finally, section 5 
presents the conclusion. 
  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
This paper contributes to the literature on 
determinants of corporate cash holdings in China in 
two ways. First, we contribute to the limited work of 
developing countries by taking into account both the 
firm characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms in a unique legal and institutional 
environment. Second, this paper provides insights 
into the current Chinese economic, governance and 
structural reforms and their impact on corporate 
cash holdings level in China. 
The literature review covers the relationship of 
cash holdings with a number of explanatory factors, 
namely: firm size, leverage, cash flow, cash flow 
volatility, bank debt, dividends, investment 
opportunities, non-cash liquid assets, managerial 
ownership, board independence and ownership 
concentration. In the following section, we discuss 
how firm-level internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm-specific characteristics are 
related to corporate cash holdings.  
 
2.1. Firm size 
 
Researchers argue that the fixed cost component of 
borrowings may result in higher level of cash 
holdings for smaller firms (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; 
Kim et al., 2011; Bates et al., 2009). Other studies 
attribute this negative relation as a result of 
difficulties in accessing the capital markets for 
smaller firms, which increases the benefits of cash 
holdings (D’Mello et al., 2008; Hardin et al., 2009; Wu 
et al., 2017; Al-Najjar & Clark, 2017). Another view is 
that larger firms are exposed to the lower risk of 
financial distress owing to the diversification of 
their products and services (Titman & Wessels, 1988; 
Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). 
However, empirical research shows quite mixed 
results. The negative results are reported by Opler et 
al. (1999) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) based on a 
sample of U.S. firms and EMU countries, respectively. 
Other studies report the non-monotonic relationship 
between firm size and cash holdings (Pinkowitz & 
Williamson, 2001; Bates et al., 2009). On the other 
hand, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), and Guney et al. 
(2007) report the insignificant relationship between 
firm size and corporate cash holdings. Consistent 
with previous studies we use a proxy for firm size 
(SIZE), which is the natural logarithm of the book 
value of total assets. We develop the following 
hypothesis: 
H
1
: There is a negative relationship between 
firm size and cash holdings.  
 
2.2. Leverage 
 
From a trade-off perspective, highly leveraged firms 
face a higher probability of bankruptcy and risks of 
financial distress, and highly levered firms are 
expected to have a higher level of cash holdings 
(Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; 
D’Mello et al., 2008). Another argument, however, 
suggests an inverse relationship for the reason that 
leverage is treated as a proxy for firms’ ability to 
issue additional debts (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Guney 
et al., 2007). Overall, trade-off model fails to predict 
a clear directional relationship. On the other hand, 
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the pecking order theory expects a negative 
relationship, owing to the reason that cash and debt 
follow an inverse pattern, in particular, when the 
level of an investment exceeds retained earnings 
(Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). Agency theory also predicts 
that leverage is negatively associated with cash 
holdings. This is because of the monitoring role of 
debt financing, which restricts high-leveraged firms 
to have a lower level of managerial discretion (Opler 
et al., 1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). Much of the 
empirical research reports a negative relationship 
between leverage and cash holdings (Opler et al., 
1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; 
D’Mello et al., 2008; Bates et al., 2009; Hardin et al., 
2009; Fernandes & Gonenc, 2016). Generally, a ratio 
of total debt to total assets is used as a proxy for 
leverage (Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan 
& Ozkan, 2004; Guney et al., 2007; Harford et al., 
2008). Following this discussion, we develop the 
following hypothesis: 
H
2
: There is a negative relationship between 
leverage and cash holdings.  
 
2.3. Corporate cash flows 
 
There are two major views about the expected 
relation between cash flows and cash holdings. 
Under the trade-off theory, cash flows are 
considered as cash substitutes (Kim et al., 1998; 
Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). In contrast, the pecking 
order theory suggests that cash flows are regarded 
as a source of internal funds, and could be better 
than costly external funds, which, thereby implies 
that cash flows are positively correlated with cash 
holdings (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; D’Mello et al., 2005; 
Chen et al., 2015). Majority of empirical research 
reports a positive relationship between these two 
variables (Opler et al., 1999; Pinkowitz & Williamson, 
2001; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; D’Mello et al., 2005). A 
few studies report a negative relationship between 
cash flows and corporate cash holdings levels 
(Hardin et al., 2009; Duchin, 2010). We measure cash 
flow (CFLOW) by dividing a firm’s cash flow by its 
total assets (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Duchin, 2010; 
Liu et al., 2015). We develop the following 
hypothesis: 
H
3
: There is a positive relationship between 
corporate cash flows and corporate cash holdings. 
 
2.4. Cash flow volatility 
 
Literature assumes a positive relationship between 
cash flow volatility and cash holdings (Opler et al., 
1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Guney et al., 2007). 
Cash flow volatility measures the degree of 
uncertainty in the future stream(s) of cash flows. 
Corporations with high cash flow volatility tend to 
hold large amounts of cash attempting to avoid the 
potential costs of liquidity constraints (Ozkan & 
Ozkan, 2004; Guney et al., 2007). Some empirical 
studies provide evidence for this theoretically 
positive relationship (Opler et al., 1999; Guney et al., 
2007; Han & Qiu, 2007). However, Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004) find evidence in support of this negative 
relationship, and, they consider this inverse 
relationship as the possible cause of higher agency 
costs and higher cost of capital. Following Ozkan 
and Ozkan (2004), Guney et al. (2007) and Liu et al. 
(2015), we measure cash flow volatility (VOLATILITY) 
by calculating the standard deviation of cash flows 
to total assets over the 5-year sample period. We 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H
4
: There is a positive relationship between cash 
flow volatility and cash holdings. 
 
2.5. Bank debt 
 
Bank financing can reduce informational 
asymmetries and agency conflicts. Therefore, banks 
could effectively perform the monitoring function of 
debt, resulting from the reduction in financing costs 
(Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). Bank financing is often 
considered as a corporate governance mechanism, 
and borrowers are often required to strictly meet the 
covenants’ requirements. Bank debt could also be 
treated as a substitution for cash, which may explain 
the expected negative relationship between bank 
debt and cash holdings. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
find a significantly negative association for a sample 
of UK firms, which is consistent with Ferreira and 
Vilela’s (2004), and Keefe and Yaghoubi (2016) 
results. On the other hand, Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2001) report a significantly positive 
relationship using a sample of Japanese firms. This 
could be explained in the context of the 
monopolistic nature of Japanese banking system, 
which extracts rent from firms in order to reduce 
their cost of monitoring. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
also explain their negative results as the possible 
reason for the lower bank power in EMU countries. 
Empirical studies define bank debt (BANK_DEBT) as 
the percentage of total bank borrowings to total 
debt (Pinkowitz & Williamson, 2001; Ferreira & 
Vilela, 2004; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). Owing to the 
different field contents in the database and the 
requirement to distinguish with the leverage, we 
consider the ratio of bank debt to total liability as a 
more appropriate representation of bank debt. We, 
therefore, derive the following hypothesis.  
H
5
: There is a negative relationship between 
bank debt and cash holdings. 
 
2.6. Dividends 
 
Companies that pay dividends are expected to hold 
less cash for the reason that they could obtain 
money by reducing their dividends (Opler et al., 
1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). 
Liu et al. (2015) document that firms without 
dividend payments are likely to raise capital in the 
external market, which discourages them from 
holding a large reserve of cash. However, the above 
studies provide no significant evidence for this 
inverse relationship. Although, Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2001) report a negative association for a 
sample of firms listed in the USA, the significantly 
positive relationship is also observed in Japanese 
and German markets (Chen et al., 2012; Hill et al., 
2014). They argue that dividend-paying firms may 
hold cash, with an intention to avoid cash shortages, 
particularly when dividend payments are needed. 
Following Opler et al. (1999) and Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004), we use a dividend dummy (DIVIDEND), which 
takes a value of one if firms have declared a 
dividend that year, otherwise, zero. We develop the 
following hypothesis: 
H
6
: There is a positive relationship between 
dividend and cash holdings. 
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2.7. Investment opportunities 
 
The theoretical literature predicts that investment 
opportunities may positively affect corporate cash 
holdings. Based on financial hierarchy theory, it is 
costly for firms to raise funds in the external 
market, and managers are likely to give up profitable 
investment projects in times when cash is needed. 
Thus, corporations with better investment 
opportunities are expected to retain more cash 
reserves (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; 
Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Terzani & Liberatore, 2016). 
Furthermore, owing to higher financial distress 
costs, companies having more investment 
opportunities are more likely to hold greater 
amounts of cash (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Ozkan & 
Ozkan, 2004; Bates et al., 2009; Belghitar & Khan, 
2013). Other empirical studies also provide evidence 
in support of trade-off and pecking-order theory 
(Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Ozkan & 
Ozkan, 2004; Bates et al., 2009; Hardin et al., 2009; 
Kim et al., 2011; Chung et al., 2015). Following the 
prior work of Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), we use the 
market value of total assets (book value of total 
assets minus book value of shareholders’ equity plus 
market value of equity) divided by book value of 
total assets (MARTOBOOK). We derive the following 
hypothesis:  
H
7
: There is a positive relationship between 
investment opportunity and cash holdings. 
 
2.8. Non-cash liquid assets 
 
Theoretically, a negative relationship is predicted 
between non-cash liquid assets and cash holdings. 
This is because non-cash liquid assets are 
considered a substitution for cash when firms are 
facing liquidity problems (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira 
& Vilela, 2004; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). Most 
empirical studies support this negative relationship 
(Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Ozkan & 
Ozkan, 2004; Chen, 2008; Bates et al., 2009; Hardin 
et al., 2009). In line with prior research (Opler et al., 
1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004), we measure non-cash 
liquid assets (LIQUID) by dividing net working 
capital by the total assets of a firm. We propose the 
following hypothesis:  
H
8
: There is a negative relationship between 
non-cash liquid assets and cash holdings. 
 
2.9. Managerial ownership 
 
According to Jensen (1986), agency problems could 
be largely reduced by increasing the level of 
managerial ownership. The rationale lies in the 
interest-alignment effect with increased managerial 
ownership. Specifically, managers are expected to 
apply resources to maximize value which is aligned 
with shareholders’ interests (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). 
The reduction in the agency conflicts contributes to 
the lower agency costs and less costly external 
financing, resulting in the lower level of cash 
holdings (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Chen, 2008). 
However, firms with high managerial ownership 
might face an increased probability of managers 
pursuing personal interests at the expense of 
shareholders (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Chen & 
Chuang, 2009; Kuan et al., 2011; Portal & Basso 
2015). This entrenchment effect implies a positive 
association between managerial ownership and cash 
reserves (Yu et al., 2015). Managerial shareholding 
refers to internal shareholdings by directors, 
supervisors, executives and other senior managers 
(Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; and Kuan et al., 2011). A 
ratio of the number of shares held by management 
divided by the total numbers of shares outstanding 
(MANAGER) is used to proxy for managerial 
ownership. We derive the following hypothesis for 
managerial ownership. 
H
9
: There is a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and cash holdings. 
 
2.10. Board independence 
 
Firms with higher board independence are less likely 
to have higher agency problems (Harford et al., 
2008). The presence of independent directors on 
corporate boards improves the quality of disclosure 
(Chahine & Filatotchev, 2008; Chen & Chuang, 2009). 
These views suggest that firms with independent 
boards are better positioned to attract external 
funds. Independent or external directors are 
generally expected to connect a firm with external 
resources. Chen and Chuang (2009) expect a positive 
relationship between board independence and cash 
holdings levels. Independent boards may also 
discourage their firms from holding excessive cash 
reserves. We define board independence 
(BOARD_INDEP) as a percentage of independent 
directors on the corporate boards (Chen & Chuang, 
2009; Liu et al., 2015). We develop the following 
hypothesis for board independence:  
H
10
: There is a negative relationship between 
board independence and cash holdings. 
 
2.11. Ownership concentration 
 
Firms with concentrated ownership structure are 
likely to own lower level of cash holdings. Large 
block holders exercise significant influence within 
their investee companies (Kuan et al., 2011). Large 
shareholders may closely monitor their companies 
compared with minority shareholders, resulting in 
lower agency costs and financing costs (Dittmar & 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Guney et al., 2007; Harford et al., 
2008; Kuan et al., 2011). Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
document that the potential conflicts between large 
shareholders and minority shareholders might 
induce large shareholders to hoard large amounts of 
cash under their control, and they may attempt to 
increase their private benefits of control. Based on 
the theoretical view of the monitoring function of 
large shareholders, the study expects a negative 
relationship between ownership concentration and 
cash holdings. We employ H-index as a proxy for 
ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP). The index 
measures the proportion of shares held by ten 
largest shareholders. This measurement is similar to 
those ratios used in the findings of Kuan et al. 
(2011) and Liu et al. (2015). We derive the following 
hypothesis for ownership concentration: 
H
11
: There is a negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and cash holdings. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Data, sample selection procedures and 
econometrics specification 
 
The data on Chinese listed firms is retrieved from 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR). We selected the period of 2012 to 
2016 as the sampling period for the reason that the 
recent statistics show the abnormal level of cash 
holdings in Chinese firms. China Securities and 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has introduced a 
number of corporate governance reforms in the past 
few years, and hence, it would be interesting to see 
the impact of such regulatory changes on corporate 
cash holdings levels in Chinese listed firms.  
The following steps were used in the sample 
selection procedures. First, we chose the Chinese 
listed firms (with A-shares) at the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are the two largest 
stock exchanges in China. Another notable feature in 
Chinese stock markets concerns market 
segmentation. We have only focused on A-shares, as 
an investment in these A-shares are only restricted 
to Chinese citizens, while the investment in B-shares 
is restricted to foreign investors. Companies can 
issue A-shares and B-shares at the same time. Thus, 
only companies issuing A-shares are included in our 
analysis, as this represents the largest segment of 
Chinese listed companies. Firms with B-shares are 
excluded from our analysis. Next, financial firms are 
excluded from our sample for the reason that they 
hold a large amount of cash due to their unique 
business/financial operations. We also exclude 
financial firms because these firms have different 
governance and regulatory requirements compared 
to non-financial firms. This study attempts to 
investigate the corporate cash holdings levels under 
the condition of normal business operations. Firms 
with continuous losses would produce abnormal 
changes in the level of cash holdings. Finally, we 
initially focused on the top 200 market 
capitalization firms from 2012 to 2016. After 
applying the sample selection criteria, the final 
sample consists of 115 Chinese listed firms. 
We test the following fixed-effects model: 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑓𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡 +
+ 𝛽6𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
(1) 
 
The definitions of all variables are reported in 
Appendix 1. 
Following the popularity of OLS in prior 
research, we started our initial analyses with Pooled 
OLS estimation. The results reported under OLS 
need to be interpreted with cautions, as OLS fails to 
control for endogeneity problems (Ullah et al., 2018). 
Fixed effects panel data estimation could correct for 
some of the endogeneity issues because the internal 
transformation process used in fixed effects could 
remove unobserved heterogeneity (Ullah et al., 
2018).  
Cash ratio is applied as a proxy to measure 
corporate cash holdings. Previous literature uses two 
major definitions of cash ratio. Prior research also 
uses a ratio of cash and marketable securities to 
total assets (Kim et al., 1998; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; 
Guney et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2015). 
The other alternative proxy is cash and cash 
equivalents to net assets, employed by Opler et al. 
(1999) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004). Owing to the 
fact that there would not be a significant difference 
in the results by using these two ratios, we used the 
cash ratio, measured by cash and cash equivalents to 
total assets. 
 
4. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all the 
variables. In order to deal with extreme outliers, we 
winsorize all of the variables at 1% level. Table 1 
shows that Chinese listed firms hold around 18% of 
their total assets in cash and cash equivalents. 
However, a higher standard deviation of 13% could 
demonstrate considerable differences in the cash 
holdings levels among Chinese listed firms. The 
average for banking financing is 27% which reflects 
the influence of Chinese banks in the financing 
activities of Chinese listed firms. Board 
independence is around 40%, while the percentage of 
ownership concentration is 51% which shows the 
degree of ownership concentration in Chinese listed 
companies. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Obs Mean SD Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
CASH 575 0.179 0.131 0.144 0.011 0.608 1.072 3.71 
SIZE 575 26.298 1.318 26.201 23.568 29.606 0.298 2.56 
LEVERAGE 575 0.529 0.192 0.522 0.123 0.847 -0.156 2.043 
CASH Flow 575 0.052 0.039 0.045 -0.017 0.197 1.179 4.868 
VOLATILITY 575 0.028 0.071 0.013 0.002 0.568 6.516 46.99 
Bank Debt 575 0.271 0.197 0.267 0 0.735 0.33 2.186 
MARTOBOOK 575 1.094 0.291 0.996 0.886 2.768 3.391 16.226 
DIVIDEND 575 0.748 0.435 1 0 1 -1.141 2.303 
LIQUID 575 -0.033 0.168 -0.42 -0.469 0.354 -0.011 2.908 
MANAGER 575 0.084 0.278 0 0 1.584 3.949 18.41 
BOARDINDEP 575 0.39 0.073 0.364 0.3 0.667 1.801 6.24 
OWNERSHIP 575 0.515 0.21 0.527 0.06 0.962 0.015 2.334 
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Figure 1 plots the changes in the average and 
median corporate cash holdings levels from 2012 to 
2016. The mean and median values of cash ratio in 
this sample decrease significantly from 2012 to 
2014, followed by a relatively stable trend in the 
following two years. The mean and median values 
indicate that Chinese firms hold a large amount of 
cash reserves. A slight decrease in the cash ratio in 
the first three years indicates cash management in 
Chinese corporations has considerably improved. 
However, the average cash ratios reported between 
31 December 2014 and 31 December 2016 vary from 
15% to 20%, implying that the management of 
corporate cash holdings in Chinese listed firms 
requires further improvement. 
 
Figure 1. Average and median cash ratio 
 
 
 
We employ a pooled OLS model in our initial 
analysis with the year and industry dummies 
included in the model. Furthermore, for all of the 
regression models, the present study tests the 
presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
attempting to avoid the biased estimates. 
 
Table 2. The impact of internal corporate governance, and firm-specific characteristics on cash holdings levels 
 
Independent variables Predicted sign Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
SIZE Negative 
-0.0263*** 
(0.0021834) 
0.0474*** 
(0.005185) 
LEVERAGE Negative 
-0.1297*** 
(0.0021786) 
-0.4201*** 
(0.012679) 
CFLOW Positive 
-0.4454*** 
(0.0205863) 
0.0451 
(0.037748) 
VOLATILITY Positive 
0.1504*** 
(0.0314317) 
0.7067*** 
(0.057865) 
BANK_DEBT Negative 
-0.3019*** 
(0.0087346) 
-0.0630*** 
(0.007198) 
MARTOBOOK Positive 
0.0859*** 
(0.010859) 
0.0254*** 
(0.004099) 
DIVIDEND Positive 
0.0227*** 
(0.00822) 
0.0131*** 
(0.000754) 
LIQUID Negative 
-0.1301*** 
(0.0214175) 
-0.4441*** 
(0.005188) 
BOARD_INDEP Negative 
-0.0361*** 
(0.0129874) 
-0.0238 
(0.016824) 
OWNERSHIP Negative 
-6.79E-06*** 
(2.60e-06) 
2.15E-06*** 
(7.64E-07) 
MANAGER Negative 
-0.0664*** 
(0.0026705) 
-0.0866*** 
(0.024418) 
Constant  
0.9917*** 
(0.0451261) 
-0.8672*** 
(0.1358) 
Year dummy  Yes Yes 
Industry dummy 
 
Yes 
 
Adjusted R-Square  0.4310 0.3781 
number of observations  575 575 
Note: ***, **, * indicate the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the level 
of corporate cash holdings in all two models. 
 
Table 2 reports the regression results for all of 
the models. From this table, the coefficients for the 
size (SIZE) in the pooled OLS model show strong 
evidence that cash holdings are negatively 
influenced by firm size. Under the fixed effects 
model, the strong positive relationship is reported, 
which is contrary to the predicted hypothesis. The 
positive relationship implies that large firms face 
less borrowing constraints in the Chinese capital 
market. This also means that many of the Chinese 
larger firms are state-owned and they get substantial 
support from state-owned Chinese banks. The 
significant and negative relationship between firm 
size and cash holdings level is consistent with the 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
31/12/2012 31/12/2013 31/12/2014 31/12/2015 31/12/2016
MEAN MEDIAN
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majority of previous studies (Opler et al. 1999; 
Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; 
Kim et al., 2011). 
We also find a significantly negative 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings 
level in all two models. In the context of a trade-off 
theory, these results support the argument that 
leverage is regarded as a proxy for companies’ 
ability to issue debts (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Guney 
et al., 2007). Thus, high levered firms could borrow 
more money, which may simultaneously increase the 
level of cash holdings. The negative impact of 
leverage is in line with the prior empirical research 
of Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Hardin et al. (2009).  
We find an insignificantly positive association 
between cash flow (CFLOW) and cash holdings level 
in the fixed effects estimation. The insignificant 
positive relation could not provide evidence for the 
pecking-order argument, which considers cash flow 
as an important source of internal funds. However, 
the negative sign in OLS estimation supports the 
trade-off view, where cash flow is regarded as a cash 
substitute. The mixed results in the two models 
could not be used to make inferences about the 
relationship between cash flow and cash holdings 
levels. In terms of cash flow volatility, the 
coefficients show the positive relationship (at 1% 
significance level) for the pooled OLS model and the 
fixed effects model. The findings show that Chinese 
companies have a tendency to hold a large amount 
of cash when facing high probability/risk of cash 
shortage. The result is in line with the earlier 
research of Opler et al. (1999) and Han and Qiu 
(2007). The results also show strong evidence that 
bank debt (BANK_DEBT) has negative impacts on 
cash holdings, which is consistent with our expected 
hypothesis. The reason lies in the monitoring role of 
bank debt, which reduces the financing costs and as 
a result bank financing offers a favourable source of 
financing compared to internally generated cash. 
This negative finding is in line with the prior 
empirical work of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004).  
We also find that non-cash liquid assets 
(LIQUID) have a negative impact on cash holdings in 
Chinese listed firms. Liquid assets are considered as 
a valid substitution for cash. This negative 
relationship is also reported in prior empirical work 
of Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Chen (2008). We 
also report that investment opportunity 
(MARTOBOOK) shows a positive relationship with 
cash holdings level in both pooled OLS and the fixed 
effects models. This indicates that Chinese firms 
anticipating investments opportunities in near 
future are more likely to increase their cash reserves 
to meet their investment requirements. Previous 
studies are also supportive of these arguments 
(Bates et al., 2009; Hardin et al., 2009; Kim et al., 
2011). We also find a positive relationship between 
dividend payment and corporate cash holdings 
levels. This implies that dividend-paying firms are 
likely to keep higher cash reserves (Chen et al., 2012; 
Hill et al., 2014). This finding contradicts the view 
that dividend-paying firms would cut the dividend to 
obtain funds (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004).  
We find that managerial ownership (MANAGER) 
is negatively associated with cash holdings. This is 
in line with the interest-alignment effect of 
managerial ownership, which shows that a conflict 
of interests between principal and agent could be 
aligned through managerial shareholdings. For 
board independence (BOARD_INDEP), the 
coefficients indicate a negative relationship, which 
highlights the monitoring role of independent 
boards in minimizing agency costs and information 
asymmetry costs in Chinese listed companies. 
Finally, our fixed effects estimation shows that 
ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP) is 
significantly positively related to corporate cash 
holdings levels in Chinese listed companies. This 
result supports the monitoring function of large 
shareholders in companies where ownership is 
highly concentrated. This is also consistent with the 
view that large blockholders play a distinctive 
monitoring role within the Chinese corporate 
governance landscape.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of the firm-
specific determinants on the level of corporate cash 
holdings for a sample of 115 large Chinese listed 
firms for the period 2012 to 2016. We report a 
number of key determinants of corporate cash 
holdings. The results show that cash holdings levels 
are negatively related to leverage, bank debt, and 
non-cash liquid assets. We also find that corporate 
cash holdings levels in Chinese listed firms are 
significantly positively associated with cash flow 
volatility, investment opportunity and dividends. For 
the remaining variables including firm size, cash 
flow, board independence and ownership 
concentration, the mixed results under OLS and 
fixed effects estimation could not ascertain their 
exact relationship with cash holdings levels. 
This paper focusses on the firm-specific 
determinants which are firm financial characteristics 
and corporate governance factors. China has a 
relatively well-developed capital market and many 
Chinese companies are going abroad (listed in the 
overseas markets), which provides them with an 
opportunity to learn and implement best corporate 
governance practices acquired in the international 
markets. Other factors such as legal environment 
and national culture also have potential effects on 
the cash holdings levels. However, the present study 
did not examine such national-level characteristics. 
Lastly, we also employed static panel data 
estimation without considering potential dynamic 
endogeneity issues. 
This paper only focuses on firm-specific factors 
in understanding the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings. Further research could examine this 
phenomenon in an international context by 
exploring how country-specific variables, including 
national culture, political stability, judicial efficiency 
and legal environment may impact corporate cash 
holdings levels.  
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Appendix 1. Definitions of variables 
  
Variables Definition 
Size (SIZE) A proxy for firm size (SIZE), which is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
Leverage (LEVERAGE) A ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Cash Flow (CFLOW) Cash flow (CFLOW) by dividing a firm’s cash flow by its total assets. 
Volatility (VOLATILITY) The standard deviation of cash flows to total assets over the 5-years’ sample period. 
Bank Debt (BANK_DEBT) A ratio of bank debt to total liability. 
Investment Opportunity 
(MARTOBOOK) 
The market value of total assets (book value of total assets minus the book value of shareholders’ 
equity plus the market value of equity) divided by book value of total assets (MARTOBOOK). 
Dividends (DIVIDEND) 
A dividend dummy (DIVIDEND), which takes a value of one if firms have declared a dividend that 
year, otherwise, zero. 
Non-Cash Liquid (LIQUID) Non-cash liquid asset (LIQUID) divided net working capital. 
Managerial Ownership 
(MANAGER) 
A ratio of the number of shares held by management divided by the total numbers of shares 
outstanding. MANAGER is used to proxy for managerial ownership. 
Board Independence 
(BOARD_INDEP) 
The number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the boards. 
Ownership Concentration 
(OWNERSHIP) 
A proxy for ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP) which is squared of the proportion of shares 
held by ten largest shareholders. 
 
